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Abstract 
In this paper, we draw on established theoretical work to analyze empirically which segments of the 
population in the target states bear the most cost when economic sanctions are imposed. Using a cross-
country analysis of 68 target states from 1960 to 2008, we find robust empirical evidence that the 
imposition of sanctions has a deleterious effect on income inequality. Focusing on various sanction 
instruments, financial and trade sanctions were found to have different impacts on income inequality. 
Lastly, the adverse effect of the sanctions is more severe when sanctions span longer durations.  
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1. Introduction 
Economic sanctions remain a ubiquitous foreign policy tool used by many countries to demand a 
change in the action of a target state. A current example of the use of economic sanctions is the 
imposition of various instruments of sanctions by the United States (US) and the European Union 
(EU) on Russia over the annexation of Crimea region of Ukraine. According to the sanctions 
literature, the cost of sanctions against a target country is supposed to result in maximum economic 
damage in order to coerce the target state to alter its policies in favor of the sender states (Kaempfer 
and Lowenberg 1988; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013). Many empirical studies 
such as van Bergeijk (1989), Pape (1997), Hufbauer et al. (2007) and Bapat and Morgan (2009) have 
focused on the effectiveness of economic sanctions in terms of their successes and failures while 
Kirshner (1997) and Marinov (2005) conclude that the use of economic sanctions to pressure target 
states is of limited relevance.  
Others such as Peksen and Son (2015), Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015a, 2015b), 
Dizaji and van Bergeijk (2013), Yang et al. (2009), Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007a) and Caruso 
(2003) have analyzed how these episodes of sanctions have instead adverse economic outcomes on 
national currency, poverty, GDP, trade, government consumption and employment. Our study 
contributes to this strand of the literature by empirically examining for the first time the impact of 
economic sanctions on the re-distribution of income within the segments of the target states. This is an 
important research question, given that widening income inequality has dire consequences on long-
term sustainable economic growth as it goes against the principle of inclusive growth, in relation to the 
lower income groups, which may well lead to civil unrest and political upheaval (Solt, 2015). Income 
inequality remains a global problem and evidence shows that global wealth is increasingly being 
concentrated in the hands of a few rich elites (OECD, 2015). In fact, Alvaredo and Gasparini (2015) 
explain that income inequality in developing countries is more unequal now than it was three decades 
ago. Relating economic sanctions to income inequality is theoretically possible as sanctions are similar 
to a prohibitive tariff that has major re-distributional inclinations within the framework of the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem (Cooper, 1989). The theoretical underpinnings of several studies in this related 
literature are detailed in the next section.  
Although economic sanctions may not involve the destruction of human capital and 
infrastructure as in the case of military wars, they may have similar consequences on the welfare of the 
people in the target economy (Allen and Lektzian, 2013). For instance, Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
(2007b) explain that sanctions are unfair as they not only burden firms that would otherwise freely 
engage in international commerce, but they also often impose suffering on innocent civilians. 
Hufbauer et al. (2007), on the other hand, estimated the impact of economic sanctions in the form of a 
reduction in foreign aid on the target states to be a possible welfare loss of 100% of the value of the 
aid. Thus some groups of people are directly worse off than the leaders of the target nations.   
There has however been a small batch of studies whose focus has been on the impact of 
sanctions on specific segments of the target state population. For instance, Wood (2008) provides 
empirical evidence that the imposition of sanctions increases state-sponsored repression and suggests 
that these sanctions contribute to worsening the humanitarian conditions of the civilian population. 
Peksen and Drury (2009, 2010) find that the imposition of economic sanctions curtails the political 
and civil rights of citizens, thereby resulting in deteriorating democratic freedom while Drury and 
Peksen (2014) highlight the economic vulnerability of women as a result of economic sanctions. Ali 
and Shah (2000) find that the United Nations (UN) sanctions on Iraq resulted in more than doubling 
the effect on infant and under-five mortality rates. Garfield and Santana (1997) on the other hand, find 
that the US sanctions against Cuba contributed to a fall in nutritional value, rising infectious diseases, 
and violent deaths for the adult and aged population. As a result of these various impacts, different 
segments of the population may suffer varying degrees of income loss under economic sanctions.  
Basically, sanctions involve several actions such as tariffs, export controls, import 
restrictions, travel bans, freezing assets, reduction or removal of foreign aid and severing of diplomatic 
relationships. If a combination of these economic embargoes does not induce a change in the behavior 
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of the political leadership of the target state, then could it be that these political leaders are somehow 
immune to the negative effects of the economic embargoes? Marinov (2005) argues there are two 
unequaled costs that the target state must incur – the political costs incurred by the political leaders 
and the economic costs incurred by the population. However, the distribution of costs associated with 
sanctions affects the political elites and the ordinary voters or citizens differently. Thus, economic 
sanctions may have a heterogeneous effect on the income distribution depending on political 
affiliations and connections of the people. By virtue of political or international connections, the 
income-reducing effects of the sanction damage can be minimized (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007a). 
Hence, sanctions can affect income distribution in a disproportionate manner from the perspective of 
the target states. In fact, Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2015b) find that US economic sanctions affect the 
poor people in the target countries that use the measure of poverty gap, and this can be expected to 
affect income distribution. 
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature in three ways. First, we draw on 
established theoretical work to analyze empirically which segments of the population bear the most 
costs when sanctions are imposed and whether this leads to a more skewed income distribution. 
Second, we quantify the effects of two main types of sanctions (trade and financial). For trade 
sanctions, we distinguish between export and import sanctions and various combinations of these 
sanction types when imposed. Sanctioning states employ different instruments of sanctions against the 
target states and Hufbauer et al. (2007) explain that the economic and political effects of the impact of 
sanction types differ in several ways. Third, we take into account the duration of the economic 
sanctions to distinguish their impact (if any) on income inequality.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical 
perspective on economic sanctions and income inequality and sets out the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 details the data and empirical methodology used. Section 4 discusses the results and finally, 
section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses Formulation  
The potential effect of economic sanctions on income inequality has been discussed in the literature 
using the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in the trade framework by Cooper (1989), the Harris-Todaro 
model by Wang (1991), the public choice approach by Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988), and the 
micro-foundations approach by Kirshner (1997). Thus, we draw on these studies and other related 
studies to provide the theoretical underpinning for the empirical analysis in this paper. Cooper (1989) 
was the first to directly link the impact of sanctions on income inequality within a theoretical trade 
model, although earlier studies such as Metzler (1949) and Bhagwati (1964) have explained how 
international trade in general affects division of income within each country by relating it to the rents 
earned by various factors of production. The explanation of the earlier studies was drawn upon by 
Cooper (1989) on the basis that sanctions are similar to prohibitive tariffs.  
Cooper (1989) argues that in contrast to popular belief, economic theory predicts that 
the position of capital is likely to be strengthened and not weakened by the imposition of sanctions 
against target states. According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, when sanctions are imposed on 
imports, it favors the factor used intensively in the import-competing sector as the domestic demand 
for domestic production of importables increases. Using the Edgeworth box representing capital and 
labor inputs versus imports and exports, together with the related production possibility curve of 
imports and exports, Cooper (1989) illustrates this particular case which leads to an increase in the 
return to capital thereby favoring capitalists; and if politicians are manipulated by capitalists, the effect 
of sanctions will be to slow down the pace of political change, while making the income distribution 
more unequal.   
More specifically, while an import embargo (restricting imports to target state) allows 
domestic producers of import-competing goods in target countries to gain compared to producers of 
exports, the consumers of imports in the target state are, however, adversely affected. But Black and 
Cooper (1988) highlight the fact that the losses suffered by producers of exports may be partly offset 
by benefits derived in their role as consumers of exports. At the same time, labor may spend a larger 
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part of its income on exports and capital owners may operate in both export- and import-competing 
industries in the target countries, thereby making the final effect on the income of the various groups 
of people unclear (ibid). Wang (1991), on the other hand, uses the Harris-Todaro model comprising a 
two-sector model with the production functions and factor-price frontiers of the agricultural and 
manufacturing sectors to show that export and import embargoes have asymmetrical effects on 
national income (through the impact of demand affecting wages and employment) and income 
distribution. All these analyses point to the fact that the impact of sanctions could differ depending on 
a targeted state’s level of trade openness and also on the intensity of labor or capital in the economy. 
For instance, Black and Cooper (1988) analyze that if domestic exporters use more labor-intensive 
relative to capital-intensive production process, then labor is expected to suffer more from sanctions 
compared to the owners of capital. 
The public choice approach of Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) examines economic 
sanctions from a different angle, whereby sanctions may be imposed to serve the interest of certain 
pressure groups within the sender state. These interest groups have different motives as they may 
enjoy some pecuniary benefits from the imposition of the sanctions, which are essentially specific 
instruments of protection that regulate goods or factor flows. For example, an embargo on exports of a 
target country would benefit producers of import-competing goods in the sanctioning country but 
harm producers of the sanctioning state that use imports from the target state as intermediate inputs. 
This predicates that sanctions may affect domestic constituents in the target (and sender states) 
differently in terms of varying degrees of income loss or gain. This may skew the income distribution 
favorably or unfavorably towards one segment of the target population.  
 Lastly, the micro-foundations approach argues that sanctions work because they 
weaken the government directly as well as motivate the most influential groups (such as the military, 
the middle class, agricultural laborers, big business etc.) to pressurize the government into protecting 
their own interests (Kirshner, 1997). The governments of target states will need to respond 
domestically because this pressure may destabilize their rule by creating political costs. In so doing, 
Escribe-Folch (2012) explains that if the rulers’ budget is not strictly constrained, they tend to increase 
spending towards the core of their political support groups. Thus, sanctions can have dramatic 
differential effects on various groups within the society (Kirshner, 1997). Hence, our main hypothesis 
is: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The imposition of economic sanctions exacerbates income inequality in 
the sanctioned or target states. 
 
The sanctions literature has also discussed the dynamics of adjustment of the effect of longer lasting 
sanctions when political leaders do not comply in the early phase. The theoretical analysis by Dizaji 
and van Bergeijk (2013) show that sanctions might be more harmful in the early rather than later 
phases, as the targets find ways to adjust their economies and thus mitigate the impact of the sanctions 
over time. However, their assertion is at odds with the notion that sanction damage increases with time 
as argued by Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007b). Thus our next hypothesis tests whether there is a 
linear and monotonic, or non-linear relationship between the duration of sanctions and income 
inequality.   
 
Hypothesis 2.  The detrimental effect of economic sanctions on income inequality 
diminishes over time or is more severe in the early phase of the sanctions.    
  
Senders of sanctions employ different instruments of sanctions and Hufbauer et al. (2007) explain that 
different types of sanctions would have different effects in several ways. For instance, they state that 
financial sanctions are more likely to hit the personal pocket of the political elites. However, this could 
also hit hard at the poor, especially if financial sanctions disrupt financial flows such as remittances 
(see Adams and Page, 2005). Trade sanctions may produce limited damage compared to financial 
sanctions since the disruption of financial flows may also disrupt international trade even without an 
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explicit trade sanction (Hufbauer et al., 2007). In addition, trade controls may be applied to selective 
products because the Geneva Convention prohibits the ban of essential goods such as food and 
medicine. Unlike financial sanctions, trade sanctions may be difficult to enforce and thus enable target 
states to circumvent the ban (ibid). Thus, the normative assumption here is that financial sanctions 
would have a more adverse impact on economic outcomes such as poverty or income inequality 
relative to trade sanctions (Wood, 2008). Financial sanctions include the interruption of commercial 
finance, transfer of remittances, access to SWIFT, foreign aid, and other official financial flows while 
export (import) sanctions refer to the interruption of exports (imports) from (by) the sender to (from) 
the target. On the basis of these different sanction types, we test the hypothesis of whether any 
differential effects on income inequality exist when different instruments are employed. Thus, our last 
hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3. The impact of financial sanctions on income inequality is more severe 
than trade sanctions. 
   
The above-mentioned theoretical economic models have all been discussed with various restrictions 
and assumptions such as only two commodities; two factors of production; under perfect competition, 
constant cost or technology scenario etc. While these models enable some analyses and predictions, 
they do not represent the realistic conditions of the world, which are far more complex with changing 
dynamics over time. Thus, the empirical examination of the hypotheses in this paper lends itself 
towards a better understanding than pure economic models on these issues. Figure 1 illustrates the 
sanctioned states and differentiates them in relation to the duration of sanctions.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
To our knowledge, only two studies have considered the impact of sanctions on incomes of different 
groups. The first is Porter (1979) who uses the static input-output relationships of eight sectors in a 
linear programming model on South Africa to estimate the impact of trade and investment sanctions 
on the incomes of whites and nonwhites, GDP, and employment in various sectors. Not only is the 
white and nonwhite grouping somewhat narrow and not relevant to the economies of today, but there 
are also several major concerns1 about the model noted by Porter (1979) himself. The second study is 
that of Khan (1988), also on South Africa, who uses multipliers from the Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM). His analysis showed that inequality among whites widened more than among blacks. First, the 
SAM approach can only be used for a single country and results cannot be generalized for other 
economies. Second, the SAM is a static analytical tool and being a snapshot of the economy, it needs 
to be continuously updated to be relevant.  
The approach considered in this paper is a departure from Porter (1979) and Khan 
(1988) but is more in line with the models used by several studies on economic sanctions. But first, we 
discuss the latest edition of the widely-used Economic Sanctions Reconsidered data set by Hufbauer et 
al. (2007) of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The available data restricts the time 
period from 1960 to 2008, based on the chosen variables for the empirical model. This data set spans 
116 cases of economic sanctions with varied durations imposed by seven principal senders on 68 
target states.2 We define the main variable of interest, sanctions, as an indicator variable, which takes a 
                                                     
1These models are only stylized abstractions of the economy they try to represent: sectoral optimization models may not 
generate explicit outcomes; the structure of the economy may dramatically alter under the pressure of the sanction and 
this cannot be considered in the model; and that there is a lot of guess work in the estimates.    
2 The principal senders are the EU, France, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, the USA, and the UN. The list of 
sanctioned states is provided in Appendix 1. Apart from the principal senders, there were also other supporting senders in 
the sanctions cases, all of which have been included in the analysis. However, we do not differentiate amongst the 
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value one for the years when any of the principal senders imposed sanctions on the target states, and 
zero otherwise. As the sanction variable is a dummy, the categories of sanctions are mutually 
exclusive and in cases where sanctions have been imposed by more than one principal sender at the 
same time, we combine and classify such cases as multiple senders. Thus, the sanction cases are fully 
separable and not partially overlapping.   
To examine whether the duration of sanctions matters, we define the duration of the 
economic sanctions by the number of years. To test for an inverted U-shaped impact of sanctions on 
income inequality in hypothesis 2, we include the square term of the duration of sanctions variable. A 
natural extension in the sanctions literature is to differentiate between the different degrees of 
sanctions (see Hufbauer et al. (2007). This is done by including the cost of sanctions as a percentage 
of GDP and in so doing, we also control for the severity of the sanctions, whether it be mild, moderate, 
or severe as identified by Wood (2008).  
The dependent variable of income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient 
from two different data sets for robustness. Although the Gini index is a widely-used measure of 
income distribution, there are challenges in its computation based on the available data. For instance, 
should an income- or a consumption-based definition be used for a more accurate measure of welfare? 
What is the extent of coverage of these measures and which consumption or income types are to be 
used? To circumvent some of these concerns and as a robustness measure, we use measures of Gini 
coefficients obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Data (SWIID) version 5.1 of 
Solt (2014), and the United Nation University’s World Institute for Development Economics Research 
(UNU-WIDER 2014). However, SWIID is the preferred source of income inequality measure as a 
large set of conversion factors for the Gini coefficients based on different income or consumption 
concepts was used to obtain comparable estimates of Gini coefficients based on gross income and net 
income. The WIDER data is used to cross-check the results. This database is less preferred as the 
reported Gini coefficient was based on consumption/expenditure or income/earnings and thus makes it 
less comparable, unlike the SWIID.3 We use the Gini coefficients based on net income from the 
SWIID, which has a high correlation of 0.8 with the WIDER data. Nevertheless, an advantage of the 
WIDER data is that it provides information on the income shares of populations belonging to various 
income quintiles. If economic sanctions do affect income inequality, it would be interesting to identify 
which segments of the population benefit, lose, or are not affected. Thus, we consider five income 
quintiles as the dependent variables.  
In order to examine the effect of sanctions on income inequality, we control for political 
factors identified in the literature that might affect income inequality. One such factor is democracy, 
where at a simple theoretical level, democracy is supposed to maximize voters’ joint interests and 
ensure that the political elite and leaders are accountable to the people. We rely on the dichotomous 
Democracy and Dictatorship database developed by Cheibub et al. (2010) who employed a minimalist 
approach to classify political regimes either as a democracy or a dictatorship. Studies on the effect of 
democracy on income distribution are however mixed (see Timmons, 2010; Chong et al., 2009). As a 
number of target states had experienced some form of conflict, we use data from Marshall and 
Marshall (2014) on the counts of coup d’état as a related measure for internal conflict. In addition, we 
control for interstate conflict using a dummy variable, sourced from the Correlates of Wars data. 
Lastly, we include a measure of political repression and human rights practices by Fariss (2014), who 
developed a latent score that measures the level of repression and respect for physical integrity rights. 
A set of economic factors are also controlled for. These include GDP per capita and its 
squared term which underlies the Kuznets hypothesis that GDP and income inequality have an 
inverted U-shaped relationship. We use national accounts data from the Penn World Tables version 
8.0 (Feenstra et al. 2013) to obtain data on GDP per capita as well as government consumption as a 
(Contd.)                                                                   
sanctioning entities as the main focus of the paper is on whether the imposition of sanctions affects income inequality 
irrespective of who the sanctioning entities are.   
3 Deininger and Squire (1996, 1998) note that Gini coefficients are generally about six or seven points larger when based on 
income compared to consumption data.   
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share of GDP.  From this same source, we obtain data on trade openness measured by the sum of 
exports and imports as a share of GDP, the price of capital goods relative to overall price level as a 
proxy for investment price, and average years of education to proxy the human capital. Table 1 
provides the summary statistics of the variables in the model.    
 
Table 1 about here 
 
In terms of the empirical strategy, the baseline equation (1) is estimated using the fixed effect 
estimator combined with Newey-West heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard 
errors. The inclusion of country fixed effects ( ) accounts for unobserved time-invariant 
heterogeneity in countries, such as social and cultural values, which if excluded can lead to the break-
down of the exogeneity condition necessary for obtaining consistent and unbiased estimates. A full set 
of time period dummies ( ) is included to account for any global trends and economic events. We 
also include the GDP per capita (GDPpc) and its square term to test Kuznets relationship while  
captures the vector of controlling variables outlined above and  is the error term.  
   
 
 
In terms of econometric issues, first, there are no serious concerns about omitted variable bias after the 
inclusion of the fixed effects and an exhaustive set of time-varying political and economic control 
variables. Second, in relation to reverse causality from income inequality to economic sanctions, there 
is no theoretical explanation for such a relationship to exist.4 It may however be argued that more 
unequal societies are likely to have more incidences of human rights violations (which is assumed to 
be one of the main reasons for the imposition of sanctions). But the empirical data does not support 
this assumption as we find a low positive correlation between income inequality and the human rights 
violations score. Nevertheless, we conduct three robustness checks for possible endogeneity. First, by 
lagging all the variables on the right-hand side of equation (1) and second, by employing a restricted 
window for the control sample and lastly, by using the generalized method of moments (GMM) to 
deal with any possible endogeneity similar to the approach used by Acemoglu et al. (2013). This 
method uses the lagged values of the possible endogenous variables as instruments and also corrects 
for mean-reverting dynamics or path dependence that often characterizes income inequality 
regressions (ibid).  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 2 reports the main empirical results testing the first hypothesis that economic sanctions may 
exacerbate income distribution within the target states. We find a strong positive significant effect of 
economic sanctions on income inequality, where on average income inequality is greater by 1.5 to 1.7 
points in countries and years in which economic sanctions were imposed. The result that imposing 
economic sanctions worsens and widens the income distribution gap within a targeted country is 
robust to two different sources of data on Gini coefficient.  
Taking into account that sanction episodes vary in terms of duration, we found that 
income distribution increases by a point of 0.26 if the duration of the sanction increases by one year. 
However, we fail to find a diminishing impact of sanctions on income inequality as the coefficient for 
the square terms although negative, is not statistically significant. Alternatively, when we differentiate 
the duration by the use of dummy variables, we find that sanctions have a  more adverse effect on 
income inequality in target states in which the duration of sanctions spans a longer period. This 
confirms Kaempfer and Lowenberg’s (2007b) theoretical analysis that the adverse impact of economic 
sanctions on target states would increase over time. 
 
                                                     
4 Neither is this supported from the empirical point of view because some countries with the highest Gini coefficient such as 
Namibia, Seychelles and Comoros have never sanctions imposed on them according to the PIIE database.     
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Table 2 about here 
 
Turning to the control variables, the results show an inverted U-shape relationship between inequality 
and GDP per capita, indicating the presence of the Kuznets relationship. This is confirmed by the 
significance of a joint F-test (on the coefficient of GDP per capita and its squared term) in the last row 
of all the reported tables. Among the control variables, human capital measured by years of education 
has the most dramatic impact in reducing income inequality obtained from SWIID but not from 
WIDER. The negative and strongly significant effect of education on the Gini coefficient from SWIID 
is in line with the conventional income inequality literature. In that, all things being equal, a higher 
level of education would be expected to reduce income inequality as a greater proportion of the 
population who acquire better and more skills become more productive and earn higher wages.  
With the relative price of investment, this has a positive effect on income inequality. 
Although this may not be consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, it could be a probable 
occurrence due to wage repression in an economy. It is possible that the use of low-skilled labor to 
replace capital may not guarantee better wages for labor when there is a high level of unemployment, 
or when there are instances of labor exploitation in the target states. In fact, Wood (2008) confirms the 
existence of such labor exploitation when he found that the imposition of sanctions increased state-led 
repression and human right abuses in sanctioned states. Specifically, Acemoglu et al. (2013) highlight 
how the ruling elites in sanctioned South Africa enacted government policies to repress the wages of 
the poor and black Africans.  
The coefficient of democracy is negative and significant using SWIID, which is 
consistent with the theoretical expectation of increased re-distributional tendencies and reduced 
income inequality. In that, a poor voter is expected to vote in favor of government policies on 
redistribution. Similarly, we only find a significant effect of human rights condition on the SWIID 
income inequality measure. For the remaining control variables of conflict, trade openness, and 
government consumption, there exists no significant relationship between them and income inequality 
measures.  
In Table 3, we show the heterogeneous effect of sanctions on different segments of the 
population.5 Sanctions have a negative effect on three of the lowest income groups by reducing their 
income shares between 0.3% to 0.5% points but there is a positive effect of 1.6% point increase in the 
income share of the population in the highest income group. A noticeable effect is that the imposition 
of sanctions increases the share of the income favorably towards the highest income quintile and 
unfavorably towards those in the lowest income quintiles. The heterogeneous effect of sanctions on 
income inequality can thus be said to lead to a more skewed distribution within the targeted states.  
 
Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
There are plausible explanations as to why different segments of the population may suffer varying 
income loss or gain during the period of sanctions. First, the sanctioned states may become isolated 
and this may enable them to veil their economic and repressive policies from the international 
community. Second, without any international watchdog, the isolation pushes the government to be 
responsible and to cater to the needs of the ‘selectorate’ instead of the population at large. The 
political/economic elites may use the period of isolation to extract a substantial amount of sanction 
rents. Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2007a) cite the case of Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, whose regime 
took advantage of the isolation that was the result of sanctions to appropriate large sanctions rents by 
creating state-run monopolies and centralizing the distribution of goods. Third, international 
organizations’ endeavors to reach out to the oppressed and poor in sanctioned states are sometimes 
                                                     
5 As indicated in Bjørnskov (2010), since the income quintiles add up to 100, the error terms of the five equations would be 
correlated. In such a case, the use of seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is more efficient. However, Wooldridge 
(2010) explains that the SUR estimates would not differ algebraically when the same regressors are used. Thus SUR was 
not undertaken as the same regressors were used in all the columns in Table 3.  
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constrained because the political elites may see them as appendages of the sanctioning states who may 
engage in espionage activities. Additionally, the activities of the aid agencies to support the poor and 
relatives of political prisoners are fraught with rent-seeking and corruption.6 
 In Table 4, we test the third hypothesis and find that the results confirm that the use of 
different types of sanction instruments produce statistically significant differential impacts on income 
distribution.7 Financial sanctions have a positive impact and skew the income distribution to make it 
more uneven. With financial sanctions, the most common instrument is the interruption of official 
development assistance and financial flows (Hufbauer et al. 2007). The cut in financial flows would 
have a direct consequence on the poor if most target states are developing countries that rely heavily 
on official development assistance or personal remittances for those in the lowest income group.  
Unlike financial sanctions, trade sanctions have a negative impact by reducing income 
inequality when they are used alone. Although trade sanctions are effective in reducing the income 
share of the population in the highest income segment, only import sanctions are significant in 
reducing income inequality. This is consistent with Cooper’s (1989) argument that the impact of 
import sanctions would fall heavily on owners of capital in the sanctioned states (who control and 
benefit substantially from the exportable sector and are in the highest income groups) as the share of 
income in the highest quintile reduces significantly. Similarly, the import bans do not have any impact 
on the share of income in the lowest quintile. This shows that the overall income inequality-reducing 
effect may be a result of the deteriorating effect on the income share of the richest quintile.   
For export sanctions, Cooper (1989) explains that this would mean a cut in investment 
capital from the advanced sanctioning states and the resort to the use of low-skilled labor in the 
production process in the sanctioned states. In terms of its effect, although the income share of the 
highest quintile reduces, the income share of those in the lowest income quintiles does not increase 
significantly and thus, low-skilled labor does not benefit. This, however, does not translate into a more 
even income distribution because, although the effect is negative on income inequality, it is not 
statistically significant. Combining trade sanctions with financial sanctions induces the most adverse 
effect on income distribution. Since financial sanctions involve the stop of financial flows (such as 
remittances or bank transfers), combining this with trade embargoes produces the most adverse effect. 
Although this economic cost may affect a good majority of the population, the political/economic 
elites may find ways to insulate themselves from the negative consequences of the sanctions. Thus, the 
ordinary and innocent citizens may be left to face the suffering caused by the sanctions without any 
social protection measures.8 
 
Tables 5 and 6 about here 
 
A check on the robustness of the impact of economic sanctions on income inequality was undertaken 
by using the lagged covariates, restricted window of control sample and GMM.  We employed a 
restricted window of three years around the sanction periods. This is because, the imposition of 
sanctions might be a consequence of an environment that is considered adverse by the sender. In other 
words, the effect captured by the sanctions dummy might be the direct negative effect of the 
sanctioned government's own policies rather than the true effect of the sanctions. To minimize this 
potential endogeneity problem, instead of the full sample period the control sample is reduced to 
consider a window of three years around the sanction period where factors related to the institutional, 
political, and social environment are likely to be similar and hence comparable (cf. Neuenkirch and 
                                                     
6 For instance, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on vast corruption in administering assistance to the 
poor and the relatives of political prisoners in Cuba (GAO, 2006).  
7 Different instruments used in the sanction cases do not overlap as each type or a combination of them is separately 
identified with a different dummy variable. The differences in the impact of different instruments of sanctions on income 
inequality are statistically significant. 
8 Phimister and Raftopoulos (2007) highlight the opulence of President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, even in the face of sanctions, 
spending extravagantly on his birthdays while the civilian population is burdened with an exorbitant cost of living. 
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Neumeier, 2015a).9 The results for this are seen in column 3 of Table 5. For the GMM method, we 
follow the approach of Acemoglu et al. (2013) where the maximum number of lags is set to five to 
restrict the number of moments. The estimations in Table 5 were done with sanctions treated as 
exogenous in column 1 and endogenous in column 2. The GMM coefficient for the economic sanction 
variable is reported with the tests of over-identification (Hansen J test) and autocorrelation showing no 
sign of misspecification. The results emphasized the adverse effect of sanctions on income 
distribution. Although the coefficients become less pronounced, they remain positive and statistically 
significant when we specify the sanction variable as either exogenous or endogenous.  
To further check on the robustness of the results obtained, we use different sub-samples 
in Table 6 to account for low and high trade-opened economies, low and high labor-abundant 
economies, as well as autocratic and democratic countries. Countries are classified in different years as 
low (high) when its trade openness measure or the share of employed labor in the population is less 
(greater) than the 50th percentile for all countries in each year. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 indicate 
that the impact of economic sanctions is more pronounced in low trade-exposed sanctioned states 
compared to high trade-exposed ones. Thus, it appears that the impact on income inequality is less 
severe for sanctioned states that are more integrated into the world trading system. This is possibly 
because more trade exposure enables an economy to source from other non-sanctioning states and 
circumvents some of the negative effects. In addition, the impact of sanctions is more harmful in 
sanctioned states with a high share of employed labor in the population. This implies that developing 
countries are more adversely affected than developed countries as the former are often characterized 
by a high labor-capital ratio compared to the latter. Lastly, from the perspective of the political regime, 
the effect of sanctions on income inequality is more debilitating for autocratic regimes compared to 
democracies as the autocratic leaders have the incentives to allocate the scare resources to their core 
supporters. These results on the robustness measure are useful in providing a nuance to the underlying 
mechanisms through which the effect of the sanctions could exacerbate income distribution. 
 
5. Conclusion  
The theoretical relationship expressed by the literature in relation to the impact of economic sanctions 
on income inequality is addressed for the first time by the empirical research in this paper.  This is an 
important issue on two fronts. First, economic sanctions are a frequently used instrument to bring 
about change in the target states and there is an ongoing research interest in the different impacts on 
the economy. Second, time and again there has been a global call to even up an economy’s income 
inequality, as seen in the reports of various international organizations. The established link between 
income inequality and economic sanctions, in particular, the adversarial effect of sanctions on income 
distribution, sheds light on the effects of sanctions against target economies going beyond the intended 
political goal and setting the target states backwards more than is intended. Even if the affected 
economies return to their trajectory of intended economic growth once sanctions are lifted, addressing 
the widened income inequality becomes an additional burden, which may slow down efforts towards 
recovery or result in less success.  
Apart from highlighting that recovery from the economic costs of imposed sanctions 
has been underestimated, this paper provides strong empirical evidence that the imposition of 
sanctions has unintended consequences for the civilian population and may affect the ordinary people 
more than the sanctioned country’s leaders. Thus, senders need to be made aware of their actions 
having an impact that is unintended or unfairly harmful. The target states, on the other hand, should be 
cautioned about ignoring the effects on income distribution that are a result of the imposition of 
sanctions, should they take too long to comply with the demands of the sanctioning states. Our 
empirical results suggest that not only does the imposition of sanctions skew income distribution in an 
uneven manner but that the effects of various types of instruments employed by the sanctioning states 
have varying consequences for the target states. While we find evidence that financial sanctions and a 
combination of financial and trade sanctions produce the greatest harm in widening income inequality, 
                                                     
9  We thank the referee for raising this point and suggesting the use of a three year window. 
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using trade sanctions (especially import bans) alone and not in combination with other sanction types 
can significantly reduce the income share of the population in the richest quintile of the target states. 
Lastly, our results also show that the impact of sanctions is more severe on income equality when 
sanctions span a longer duration.    
In light of these results, future research identifying the channels through which the 
imposition of sanctions could affect the civilian population adversely would be important; this could 
help to devise mechanisms to avoid or minimize the unintended consequences. Based on the results of 
the adverse impact of financial sanctions on income inequality, further research looking at the 
differential impact (if any) of various types of financial sanctions related to financial aid, capital flows, 
bank lending, access to SWIFT, etc. would produce a better understanding. The lack of data on the 
type of financial sanctions imposed has prevented the examination of this issue. It thus remains to be 
seen if different financial instruments will affect different segments of the society in a myriad of 
diverse ways.  
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Figure 1: Map showing the targeted states with respect to the duration of sanctions 
 
 
 
Note: The legends differentiate the duration of sanction, the darker the color, the longer the duration 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Number of 
observation
s 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum
. 
Economic sanctions 883 0.217 0.413 0 1 
Financial sanctions 183 0.311 0.464 0 1 
Export sanctions 183 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Import sanctions 183 0.005 0.074 0 1 
Duration of sanction (years) 183 6.557 5.508 1 24 
Gini index (WIDER) 883 42.286 9.897 20.100 72.450 
Gini index (SWIID) 883 40.644 9.248 20.306 67.822 
1st Income quintile (Q1) 706 5.596 2.135 1.070 11.010 
2nd Income quintile (Q2) 706 9.919 2.483 2.030 15.530 
3rd Income quintile (Q3) 706 14.314 2.372 6.351 19.700 
4th Income quintile (Q4) 706 21.075 2.112 12.499 31.250 
5th Income quintile (Q5) 706 49.149 8.378 32.460 76.688 
Log GDP per capita 863 8.398 0.972 5.094 10.223 
Trade openness ratio 863 0.450 1.075 5.02X 10-6 20.775 
Government consumption as % of 
GDP 863 0.195 0.108 0.020 1.559 
Sanction cost as % of GDP 830 1.311 2.628 -6.303 19.801 
Human capital (years of education) 832 2.268 0.566 1.052 3.495 
Democracy index 883 0.583 0.493 0 1 
Internal conflict (number of coups) 883 0.043 0.224 0 2 
Interstate conflict 883 0.023 0.149 0 1 
Human rights score 883 -0.106 1.284 -2.894 3.836 
Relative price of investment 863 0.552 0.568 0.035 5.442 
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Table 2: Impact of economic sanctions on the Gini-coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Source of Gini Co-efficient: WIDER SWIID SWIID SWIID SWIID 
Log GDP per capita 21.79*** 10.01* 6.945 6.999 6.916 
 (7.672) (6.033) (5.443) (5.453) (5.390) 
(Log GDP per capita)2 -1.058** -0.368 -0.193 -0.194 -0.192 
 (0.427) (0.330) (0.302) (0.303) (0.300) 
Trade openness -0.262 -0.525** -0.504** -0.516** -0.482* 
 (0.335) (0.243) (0.246) (0.245) (0.245) 
Government consumption 3.990 5.765* 4.845 4.940* 4.590 
 (3.732) (2.958) (2.998) (2.985) (2.981) 
Human capital 3.038 -7.935*** -8.839*** -8.587*** -8.857*** 
 (2.831) (1.445) (1.429) (1.426) (1.423) 
Investment price 2.558** 2.153** 2.042** 2.049** 2.116** 
 (1.209) (0.896) (0.884) (0.889) (0.877) 
Sanction cost as % of GDP -0.0728 -0.0600 -0.0880 -0.0760 -0.0548 
 (0.265) (0.110) (0.129) (0.126) (0.124) 
Democracy -0.237 -1.720*** -1.754*** -1.682** -1.817*** 
 (0.876) (0.633) (0.652) (0.654) (0.649) 
Internal conflict (number of 
coups)  
0.0363 -0.507 -0.424 -0.403 -0.580 
 (0.965) (0.584) (0.580) (0.579) (0.572) 
Interstate conflict -1.426 -1.022 -0.263 -0.264 -0.607 
 (1.263) (0.815) (0.776) (0.774) (0.778) 
Human rights score 0.464 0.689** 0.542* 0.572* 0.640** 
 (0.429) (0.316) (0.317) (0.324) (0.320) 
Sanction 1.504** 1.725***    
 (0.614) (0.514)    
Duration of sanction   0.261*** 0.376***  
   (0.0815) (0.140)  
(Duration of sanction)2    -0.00719  
    (0.0101)  
Duration of sanction (<10 
years) 
    1.126** 
     (0.463) 
Duration of sanction (>10 
years) 
    4.670*** 
     (1.302) 
Constant -81.25** -9.866 6.058 5.038 6.335 
 (34.90) (28.09) (24.65) (24.56) (24.27) 
Observations 779 779 779 779 799 
Adjusted R square 0.832 0.881 0.881 0.882 0.880 
Kuznets F-test 7.493*** 10.81*** 11.76*** 12.24*** 11.91*** 
Joint F-test  (duration of 
sanction) 
- - - 9.005*** - 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses.   
            Time and country fixed effects are included.  
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table 3: Impact of economic sanctions on the income quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Income quintiles: Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Log GDP per capita 1.348 -2.594 -4.882*** -1.925 11.46* 
 (2.097) (1.999) (1.781) (1.953) (6.424) 
(Log GDP per capita)2 -0.132 0.0972 0.251** 0.118 -0.560 
 (0.119) (0.114) (0.102) (0.109) (0.362) 
Trade openness 0.227** 0.0439 -0.0458 -0.0519 -0.161 
 (0.0904) (0.0937) (0.0840) (0.0946) (0.301) 
Government consumption -1.687* -0.544 -0.758 -0.153 2.951 
 (0.991) (1.006) (0.931) (0.980) (3.276) 
Human capital 1.783*** 2.467*** 2.087*** 1.784*** -4.895** 
 (0.672) (0.629) (0.583) (0.636) (2.008) 
Investment price -0.619** -0.332 -0.0395 -0.126 1.120 
 (0.263) (0.298) (0.266) (0.283) (0.952) 
Sanction cost as % of GDP -0.00782 -0.0214 -0.0209 0.0284 -0.00315 
 (0.0468) (0.0496) (0.0555) (0.0441) (0.194) 
Democracy -0.0458 -0.0119 0.121 0.342 -0.261 
 (0.203) (0.205) (0.210) (0.266) (0.730) 
Internal conflict (number of 
coups)  
-0.0690 -0.104 -0.319 -0.763** 1.061 
 (0.238) (0.309) (0.343) (0.383) (1.098) 
Interstate conflict -0.00187 0.161 0.331 0.576 -1.060 
 (0.279) (0.314) (0.290) (0.557) (1.079) 
Human rights score -0.191** -0.131 -0.176* -0.169 0.663** 
 (0.0944) (0.0973) (0.0957) (0.127) (0.328) 
Sanction -0.481*** -0.439*** -0.341** -0.264 1.594*** 
 (0.151) (0.159) (0.155) (0.211) (0.543) 
Constant 3.387 22.35** 35.61*** 26.48*** -7.494 
 (9.493) (8.928) (7.893) (8.874) (29.18) 
Observations 634 634 634 634 634 
Adjusted R-square 0.796 0.832 0.821 0.677 0.826 
Kuznets F-test 11.33*** 9.245*** 6.166*** 0.799 3.570** 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses.   
             Time and country fixed effects are included.  
             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Impact of different types of economic sanctions on income inequality 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Income inequality: SWIID Q1 Q3 Q5 
Log GDP per capita 11.87* 1.178 -5.527*** 13.66** 
 (6.133) (2.195) (1.906) (6.786) 
(Log GDP per capita)2 -0.471 -0.120 0.290*** -0.698* 
 (0.336) (0.124) (0.108) (0.382) 
Trade openness -0.430* 0.206** -0.0743 -0.0461 
 (0.244) (0.0899) (0.0837) (0.296) 
Government consumption 5.305* -1.542 -0.609 2.183 
 (2.951) (0.979) (0.924) (3.225) 
Human capital -8.717*** 1.941*** 2.276*** -5.625*** 
 (1.473) (0.699) (0.605) (2.075) 
Investment price 2.152** -0.561** -0.0509 1.157 
 (0.914) (0.276) (0.276) (1.019) 
Sanction cost as % of GDP -0.0992 -0.00867 -0.0150 -0.0162 
 (0.107) (0.0469) (0.0554) (0.191) 
Democracy -1.556** -0.0699 0.0651 -0.0223 
 (0.643) (0.207) (0.213) (0.734) 
Internal conflict (number of coups)  -0.587 -0.0311 -0.276 0.870 
 (0.599) (0.246) (0.351) (1.126) 
Interstate conflict -1.168 0.0534 0.347 -1.242 
 (0.802) (0.297) (0.304) (1.110) 
Human rights score 0.650** -0.183* -0.159* 0.586* 
 (0.313) (0.0949) (0.0940) (0.318) 
Financial sanctions  1.780** -0.344 -0.454 1.902* 
 (0.767) (0.216) (0.300) (1.021) 
Export sanctions  -0.973 0.216 1.034 -4.992* 
 (1.395) (0.449) (0.825) (2.741) 
Import sanctions  -2.762*** 0.0425 1.096*** -3.270*** 
 (0.846) (0.347) (0.276) (1.120) 
Financial and import sanctions  4.385*** -1.052** -1.170** 3.946** 
 (1.369) (0.484) (0.518) (1.866) 
Financial and export sanctions  1.383 -0.717** -0.408* 2.258** 
 (0.870) (0.286) (0.239) (0.875) 
Export and import sanctions  -0.203 -0.0598 0.119 -0.0443 
 (0.992) (0.332) (0.360) (1.140) 
Financial, import and export sanctions  2.908*** -0.564 -0.398 1.760* 
 (0.961) (0.354) (0.257) (1.001) 
Constant -16.38 3.608 37.83*** -14.49 
 (28.41) (9.903) (8.428) (30.62) 
Observations 779 634 634 634 
Adjusted R-square 0.877 0.796 0.833 0.823 
Kuznets F-test 11.15*** 10.28*** 5.947*** 3.400** 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses.   
            Time and country fixed effects included. 
             *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Robustness analysis using GMM and control sample  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Empirical method: Lagging all 
covariates 
Restricted 
control 
GMM 
Source of Income inequality: WIDER SWIID SWIID SWIID SWIID 
Economic sanctions 1.351** 1.551*** 1.214** 0.809*** 0.558*** 
 (0.651) (0.565) (0.513) (0.234) (0.08) 
Sample size 475 475 160 231 231 
P-value for Hansen J test  - - - 0.126 0.306 
P-value for first-order auto-correlation test - - - 0.003 0.011 
P-value for second-order auto-correlation 
test  
- - - 0.211 0.187 
Covariates treated as an endogenous 
variable 
- - - No Yes 
 
Notes:   Robust standard errors in parentheses.   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
In column (3) we restrict the control sample to a three year window before and after the imposition of the 
sanctions. 
             All controls, time and fixed effects are included.  
 
 
Table 6: Robustness analysis using sub-samples on the basis of trade openness, labor-abundance,      
              and political regimes 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: 
SWIID Gini index 
Low-
trade 
exposed  
countries 
High-trade 
exposed  
countries 
Low share 
of labor 
employment 
High share 
of labor 
employment 
Autocratic 
political 
regime 
Democratic 
political 
regime 
       
Economic sanctions 1.867*** 0.396 1.126* 2.898*** 3.924*** -0.322 
 (0.704) (0.625) (0.594) (0.719) (0.727) (0.774) 
       
Sample size 394 363 382 378 317 462 
R-squared 0.848 0.927 0.895 0.883 0.880 0.880 
Kuznets F-test statistic 8.847*** 1.671* 1.210 4.486** 3.244** 2.543** 
 
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors in parentheses 
            All controls, time and country fixed effects are included.   
            *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix 1        List of Sanctioned States 
Count Sanctioned States 
 
Count Sanctioned States  
1 Afghanistan 35 Latvia  
2 Albania 36 Lebanon  
3 Algeria 37 Lithuania 
4 Angola 38 Malawi  
5 Argentina 39 Mexico  
6 Azerbaijan 40 New Zealand 
7 Bolivia 41 Nicaragua 
8 Brazil 42 Niger  
9 Cambodia 43 Nigeria  
10 Cameroon 44 Pakistan  
11 Chile 45 Panama  
12 China 46 Paraguay  
13 Colombia 47 Peru  
14 Cote D'Ivoire 48 Poland  
15 Cuba 49 Rwanda  
16 DR Congo 50 Sierra Leone 
17 Dominican Republic 51 Somalia  
18 Ecuador 52 South Africa 
19 Egypt 53 Sudan  
20 El Salvador 54 Suriname  
21 Estonia 55 Syria  
22 Ethiopia 56 Taiwan  
23 Gambia 57 Thailand  
24 Greece 58 Togo  
25 Guatemala 59 Tunisia  
26 Haiti 60 Turkey  
27 India 61 Turkmenistan 
28 Indonesia 62 Uganda  
29 Iran 63 Ukraine  
30 Israel 64 Uruguay  
31 Jordan 65 Vietnam  
32 Kazakhstan 66 Yemen  
33 Kenya 67 Zambia  
34 Lao 68 Zimbabwe 
 
 
 

  
 
